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THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT:
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 3426
James H. Pooley*

I. INTRODUCTION
Trade secret litigation is close to becoming one of the high
technology industry's fastest growing markets. Fifteen years ago,
this type of lawsuit was uncommon and was directed at fairly extreme acts of disloyalty and theft. Today, highly qualified technical
employees can scarcely consider changing jobs without risking expensive, career-threatening litigation.. This is due to the industry's
increasing reliance on slight and short-lived technical innovations to
give a company its competitive edge and on a growing awareness
that the courts are available to protect highly valuable intellectual
assets. Moreover, since the extraordinarily expensive trade secret
lawsuit can easily be used to squash an incipient competitor, the
law preventing unfair competition has excellent potential as one of
the monopolist's most effective weapons.'
Whatever the cause and effect, trade secret litigation is a major
issue for technology-related business. At the same time, trade secret law differs from state to state and is decided on a case by case
basis. The modem common law of trade secrets has drawn its principles chiefly from the First Restatement of Torts, which defined
the subject matter and remedies in a general fashion. However, the
courts have relied on a potpourri of theories, including trade secrets
as property, breach of trust or confidence, and breach of contract.
The bench and bar have taken note of the problems in the interpretation and enforcement of trade secret rights. In the 1960's
there was considerable concern that state law governing trade
secrets was preempted by the federal patent system, which was
based on the principle of public disclosure of inventions. Although
never articulating that direct holding, the United States Supreme
Court through its decisions in Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co., Cornpco
Copyright @ 1985 James H. Pooley. All Rights Reserved.
* James Pooley is an attorney with the law firm of Mosher, Pooley & Sullivan in Palo
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1. See, Pooley, The Trade Secret Lawsuit As An Anticompetitive Tool, 1COMPUTER L.
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Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc. and Lear, Inc. v. Adkins2 created
speculation that this result was inevitable. The later cases Aronson
v. Quick Pint Pencil Co. and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.3 have

quieted the fears of pre-emption, but in the process attention has
been drawn to the patchquilt nature of the available caselaw on
trade secret protection.
The call for statutory reform arose in this context. With the

rapid advances in technology throughout the country, the uneven
development of decisional law from state to state was seen as a major problem. In addition, the leading cases presented a confusing

array of standards and theories on what information should be protected and what conduct should be proscribed. Finally, the bedrock
source of principles disappeared, as the drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts concluded that the law of unfair competition had

come into a life of its own and dropped the seminal language that
had been incorporated into scores of published opinions. The time
had come to fill the void with a unified approach to trade secret
litigation.
The substantial work of producing a uniform state law on the

subject was undertaken by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which in 1979 approved, and recommended for adoption by the states, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
The proposed statute was approved by the American Bar Associa-

tion the following year.4 Since then it has been adopted in some
form by at least twelve states.' This essay focuses on the California
2. Sears, Roebuck v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, rehg denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653 (1969).
3. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 99 S. Ct. 1096 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
4. In 1981, however, the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association issued resolutions opposing the Act as drafted and proposing specific amendments. Apparently in response to this criticism, the Commissioners, at their
December 1984 meeting, issued amendments to the Uniform Act. See Appendix A, infra.
These amendments for the most part do not change the substance of the Act, or have already
been incorporated into the California statue (drafts of the ABA proposals were available
during the 1984 legislative drafting process).
5. See ARse.STAT. ANN. § 70-1001 to 1007 (West Supp. 1983); 1983 CONN. ACT 344;
DEL CODE ANN. Tit. 6, § 2001-09 (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 48-801 to 807 (West
Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-1 to 24-3-2-3-8 (Bums Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3320 to 3330 (Vernon Supp. 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1431-39 (West
Supp. 1984); MxNN. STAT. ANN. § 325C.01-08 (West 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152 to
157 (Michie Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47.25.1-01 to 08 (Smith Supp. 1983); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 19.108.010 to .940 (West Supp. 1984).
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statute, enacted in 1984 and effective as of January 1, 1985.6
II.

STRUCTURE OF THE CALIFORNIA STATUTE

The California statute is similar in structure and language to

the Uniform Act.7 The legislation defines the act of misappropriation of a trade secret, describes various remedies available, and out-

lines special procedures to be followed in litigation of trade secret
disputes. It provides for a three-yeAr statute of limitations, and
specifies its limited preemptive effect with respect to other statutes.

With the exception of one section (peculiar to California) relating
to discovery and therefore placed as section 2036.2 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, the entire statute is set forth as section 3426 of the
Civil Code.

It is clear that the California legislature intended to secure the
benefits of uniformity with other state statutes. Section 3426.8 provides that the legislation "shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this title among states enacting it."8 Moreover, the offi-

cial comments which were promulgated along with the Uniform
Act have been incorporated verbatim as part of the California law,

with one exception relating to a specific amendment which required
additional comment. 9

A.

"Trade Secret"

The statute defines "trade secret" as any:
[ilnformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro6. A synopsis of the legislative history of the California statute is found in Appendix
A, infra.
7. Differences between the Uniform Act and the California statute will be highlighted
and discussed infra.
8. However, a cautionary note is appropriate here. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
like the Restatement, gives general guidelines. In interpreting those guidlines, it is possible
that the courts of other states will not accept California's strong policies which tip the balance of rights in favor of open competition. See, e.g., Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co.
v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980); Frame v. Merrill Lynch, 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97
Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971).
9. The California statute was amended in the Senate Committee on Judiciary to remove the requirement that a plaintiff prove that the claimed trade secret is not "readily ascertainable." This was proposed by the State Bar, on the ground that the definition as originally
stated was ambiguous and unfairly required the plaintiff to prove a negative.
New language (drafted primarily by the author of this essay) was added to the official
comments, to shift the burden, making it clear that a defendant could show by way of defense
that given information was "readily ascertainable." The official comments as amended were
adopted by the Senate Committee on Judiciary as reflective of legislative intent. See infra
notes 17 & 18 and text accompanying.
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gram, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being

generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject
of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to main10
tain its secrecy.
The first distinction between the statutory definition and the

Restatement is the inclusion of information which has "potential"
value. Under a literal reading of the Restatement, a claimed trade

secret could qualify only when the holder could show that it was
actually used in its business: "A trade secret may consist of any
formula pattern, device or compilation of information which is used
in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."11
The official comments to the Act explain that the statutory definition reaches beyond the Restatement in order to extend "protec-

tion to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or acquired
the means to put a trade secret to use."

2

It does not appear that

the Commissioners meant to abrogate the recognized distinction applied to concepts or abstractions, which have been held not to qual-

ify.13 Under prior California law, "ideas," of potential value in a
speculative sense, can be the basis of a claim only where there exists
4
an express or implied obligation to hold the idea in confidence.'
The statutory imprimatur on "potentially useful" inventions,
however, does seem to put an end to the argument that an employee's inventions produced on behalf of an employer are entitled

to lesser protection than the employer's existing trade secrets which
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 1985).
11. The "used in one's business" standard, however, has not been given a literal interpretation by the California courts. See, e.g., Sinclar v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal.
App. 3d 216, 222, 116 Cal.Rtpr. 654 (1974) where the court stated:
[t]he portable device converting brain waves to audible form was, to say the
least, a mechanical improvement on the previous stationary equipment used in
laboratories. In addition, the device was put to mass commercial production in
appellant's business. Under these circumsatnces, appellant's claim that the inventor did not utilize the device in his own business is entirely immaterial and
has no bearing on the issues at hand.
12.

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr, 14 U.L.A. 541, 543 (1980).

13. Richter v. Westab, Inc., 529 F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 1976)(a fashion coordinating
concept whereby notebook covers would be coordinated with clothing fashions was not a
trade secret under Ohio law).
14. Densy v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956); Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d
502, 535 P.2d 1161 (1975); and Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium &
Chem. Corp., 267 F.Supp. 726, 730 (S.D. Cal. 1967), modified, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969).
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are disclosed to an employee. 5
The Uniform Act settles the issue of "negative information" by

giving it trade secret status. There is some authority for the proposition that employees are free to use their knowledge "of what not
to do" in their future employment. 16 However, the comments to
the Uniform Act make it clear that the definition of trade secret

includes such negative information as "the results of lengthy and
expensive research which proves that a certain process will not
work." This represents a significant clarification of the law. The

general skill acquired by an employee is and should be transportable
to future employment. However, the problem of distinguishing be-

tween that learned skill and the trade secret knowledge of specific
techniques found not to work is a difficult one and will have to be
addressed and solved in the courts.

A second important feature of the definition of "trade secret"
in the California statute arises from a modification to the language
originally proposed in the Uniform Act. The original version of the
first subsection of Civil Code Section 3426.2(d), taken from Section
1(4)(i) of the Uniform Act,' 7 required that the the value of the information be derived "from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainableby proper means by, another person who

can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use."' 8 The California legislature altered the Uniform Act to read: "from not being

generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use." The requirement that
15. The argument was based on language in Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160
A.2d 430 (1960), which was cited with approval in Futurecraft v. Clary Corp. 205 Cal. App.
2d 279, 283, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962):
The court concluded that Greenberg was privileged to disclose and use the
formulas which he had developed - they being a part of the technical knowledge and skill t lat he had acquired by virtue of his employment (p.437). Therefore, even though the formulas were plaintiff's trade secrets, Greenberg was
privileged to use them.
It is understandable, even before enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, that the courts
did not rush to embrace this approach. Reading the language of the Uniform Act together
with California Labor Code Sections 2860 and 2870 would seem to bury this argument for
good. The result makes sense, since there is no logical justification for extending ownership
rights to an employee when the employer paid for the creative work.
A more difficult question of relative rights is presented when the employee later seeks to
use "skills" which he developed in conjunction with, or indeed which contributed to, the
invention created for the employer.
16. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 144 (9th
Cir. 1965) (employees privileged to use knowledge of shortcomings in former employer's
machine in order to build improved version for subsequent employer).
17. UNIF.TRADE SECRET ACr, 14 U.L.A. 541, 542 (1980).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(d) (West 1985).
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the plaintiff prove that the information is not "readily ascertain-

able" has been omitted from the statute. This amendment was proposed by the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the State
Bar apparently as a reaction to a recent appellate court decision in
Indiana.19
To be a workable standard, "readily ascertainable" must be

viewed in the same way as "improper means." It is a deliberately
vague formulation which is to be applied in a factual context. If the

effort required to recreate data is very substantial, then it is not
readily ascertainable; if the effort is relatively small, then the data
will be considered available for use by those who know it, regardless
of the source.2 0
The uniform comments make it clear that information cannot
be considered a trade secret if it can quickly (i.e., "readily") be reverse engineered. 2 On the other hand, the Uniform Act specifically

recognizes that a trade secret exists in the "headstart" which accrues to the trade secret holder who markets a product that requires

a more substantial reverse engineering effort. 2
In the legislative hearings during 1984, the State Bar continued
to press for this amendment, and a compromise was eventually
reached, permitting the amendment while inserting new language
into the official comments making it clear that the "readily ascertainable" standard remains available as a matter of affirmative defense. 23 Thus, the issue is simply one of burden of proof; under the
19. Steenhoven v. College Life Insur. Co. of Amer., 460 N.E.2d 973 (Ct. App. Ind.
1984) holds that a list of insurance policy holders and related information could not qualify
as a trade secret because the data could have been properly acquired from the policyholders
themselves. Examining the opinion, however, one finds no new standard expressed. The
result appears odd, but is either wrong or stems from special facts not apparent from the face
of the opinion. Certainly, when dealing with a "compilation" such as a customer list, it must
be recognized that value exists from the effort of compiling the data. To determine the issue
on the fact that effort is capable of duplication, without critical analysis of the amount of
effort involved, simply begs the question.
20. Thus, in the customer list context, the "list of names" claimed as a trade secret will
be "readily ascertainable" if it consists in the simple identification of all potential customers
who are listed elsewhere in trade publications and catalogs. It will not be "readily ascertainable" if it is a subset identified by characteristics of profitability, revenue generation and the
like, information developed by an employer over time in the conduct of its business. This
comports both with common sense and with long-established case law. See, e.g., Nalley's Inc.
v. Corone Processed Foods Inc., 240 Cal. App. 2d 948, 50 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1966).
21. The Commissioners cite Wesley-Jessen, Inc. v. Reynolds, 182 U.S.P.Q. 135, 144145 (N.D. IM.1974) for the proposition that a camera sold on the open market cannot preserve its trade secrets when it can be reverse engineered in "several days."
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 1985). See infra, note 53 and accompanying
text.
23. See Appendix A, infra.
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California version of the Uniform Act, the defendant must carry
that burden. Therefore, while on the surface it may appear that a
major change has taken place, a reading of the statutory language
together with the official comments demonstrates that the change
will have little effect.
The overall objective of trade secret law is to enforce reasonable standards of commercial morality, and the statutory language
serves as a guideline which must be interpreted in this context.
Therefore, when the trade secret information can be gathered, like
pieces of a puzzle, from data in the public domain, but the successful collection of that data by the defendant occurred only with benefit of how the finished puzzle would appear, a court is justified in
rejecting the "readily ascertainable" defense.2 4 The defense should
generally apply where the "reverse engineering" or "independent
discovery" effort is in fact minimal, so as to support the inference
that the defendant could easily have accomplished it had he in good
faith thought it was required. Therefore it is only necessary to show
that the product could have been easily reversed engineered not that
it was reversed engineered.
A third, and more significant, change in the definition of a
"trade secret" is the requirement that plaintiffs prove they have expended reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information
sought to be protected. The standard of reasonableness is consistent
with current case law, which imposes on a trade secret holder the
obligation to use measures that are appropriate to the technology
which it claims as a secret.2 5 Absolute secrecy is not required. 6
The significance of the statutory requirement is that a plaintiff cannot prove a trade secret simply by showing a vague intent or pronouncement that it be treated that way. Rather, the statute, as did
the common law, requires the showing of some affirmative acts
taken by the plaintiff in advance of the litigation which can be
viewed as strong circumstantial evidence of such an intent. The official comments explain what should be expected:
[R]easonable efforts to maintain secrecy have been held to include advising employees of the existence of a trade secret, limit24. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3rd Cir. 1982). There was
extensive testimony indicating that defendants had tried and failed to duplicate plaintiffs
method of producing latex paint. Only after defendants obtained the process itself by hiring
the developer could they produce a competing product. Therefore, defendant's litigationinspired collection of public literature which arguably revealed the process was held insufflicient to avoid the misappropriation claim.
25. K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974).
26. Id. at 473.
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ing access to a trade secret on 'need to know basis' and
controlling plant access. On the other hand, public disclosure of

information through display, trade journal publications, advertising, or other carelessness can preclude protection.2 7

Many companies operating within the technology industries
are relatively young, and have neglected to prepare a comprehensive
program for the protection of proprietary data. This statutory development provides an opportunity for counsel to remind such clients that inaction can lead to disaster, and that a comprehensive
trade secret protection plan should be developed and
implemented.28
B. Misappropriation
The statute defines misappropriation by reference to six specific
types of conduct. The first three begin with acquisition of a trade
secret by "improper means." As described below, "improper
means" is broadly defined and encompasses conduct which, in the
opinion of the court, falls below an acceptable level of commercial
morality.2 9

The first class of prohibited conduct is acquisition of a trade
secret with knowledge or reason to know that it was acquired by
improper means. 30 Under the common law, possession of another's
trade secret is insufficient to establish liability for damages without
a showing of use or further unauthorized disclosure. Since the Act
provides an injunctive remedy for threatened use (including an order to return trade secret materials) it is appropriate to define misappropriation as including mere unauthorized possession.
However, a reasonable interpretation of the statute would require
that the plaintiff demonstrate use or further disclosure of the trade
secret by the defendant in order to recover money damages.
The other five categories of "misappropriation" expressly require disclosure or use. The second type applies to disclosure or use
31
of a trade secret by one who used improper means to acquire it.
This is an extension of liability to the person described in the first
category who has gone on to use the trade secret he improperly
acquired.
27.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2) (West 1985), see official comments,

28. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3rd Cir. 1982).
29. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015, cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1970).

30.
31.

CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426.1(b)(1) (West 1985).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(A) (West 1985).
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The third category goes beyond the person who engaged in the
improper acquisition, and applies to disclosure or use by one who
knew or should have known that the secret was acquired by improper means. 32 Liability is imposed under this subsection without
regard to the actor's participation in acquisition of the trade secret,
but attaches only in the event that it can be proved that the defendant used or disclosed the trade secret after he had actual or constructive knowledge that the information was improperly obtained.
The remaining three categories of misappropriation assume
that the information was acquired properly, but that disclosure or
use has occurred in contravention of some express or implied
agreement to hold the information as confidential.3 3 This is to be
distinguished from circumstances which create a confidential relationship, without regard to an express or implied undertaking, to
hold a particular matter in confidence. 3 4
The fourth category of "misappropriation" applies to disclosure or use of a trade secret by one who acquired it under an express
or implied duty to keep it confidential. 35 Fifth, the definition applies to disclosure or use where one knew or should have known
that the information was subject to an obligation of confidentiality. 36 This subsection would apply to an employer who hires away
an extremely knowledgeable technical employee and "looks the
other way" while the employee effectively recreates his former employer's trade secrets. 37 The breadth of this subsection is defined
by the phrase "reason to know", which should extend to any situation in which the circumstances would indicate to the second employer that the confidential information of the former employer was
being put at risk of use or disclosure.
The sixth type of misappropriation arises from accidental disclosure. Here, liability for disclosure or use is imposed only if (1)
the defendant knew or should have known that the information was
acquired by accident or mistake, and (2) the knowledge is acquired
before a material change of position by the defendant.3 8 In the
Commissioners' most recent amendment to the Uniform Act, this
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 1985).
33. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 140 (9th
Cir. 1965).
34. Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal.3d 502 at 510, 536 P.2d 1161 (1975).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1985).
36. CIv. CAL. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West 1985).
37. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chemical Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3rd Cir. 1982). See supra
note 24.
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(C) (West 1985).
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subsection is deleted as "redundant," since the issue of a good faith
"misappropriation" is covered in other portions of the Act.3 9
C. Improper Means
According to the Restatement, "improper means" is a term incapable of precise definition, but which refers to action "below the
generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct."'' The breadth of this standard is illustrated by E.L
4 1 where the defendant atduPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,
tempted to justify his aerial surveillance of a chemical plant under
construction by claiming that it was in plain view. The court
explained:
In taking this position we realize that industrial espionage of the
sort here perpetrated has become a popular sport in some segments of our industrial community. However, our devotion to
freewheeling industrial competition must not force us into accepting the law of the jungle as the standard of morality expected
in our commercial relations.42
One commentator has suggested - accurately - that the application of this standard in any given case depends upon the particular moral values of the trier of fact: "A means is 'improper'
because a court decides just that."4 3 In practical terms, the law requires that business competitors avoid more than clear dishonesty,
fraud and bad faith; they are also well advised that this standard
may prevent potential misappropriations from circumventing the
statute by a mere technicality. In effect, attempt to get something
for nothing will most likely fail as being unacceptable conduct.
The California statute, unlike the Uniform Act, adds a specific
exemption of reverse engineering from the definition of "improper
means." 4 This amendment was unnecessary, since the official comments expressly state that reverse engineering is a "proper means"
of discovering a trade secret. However, in the case of a major reverse engineering effort, it must be demonstrated that the effort was
undertaken, not merely that it could have been.
39.

See Appendix A, infra.

40.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757, comment f, (1939).

41.

431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).

42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1016.
120 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 388 (1971).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West 1985).

UNIFORM TRDE SECRET ACT

1985]
III.

PROCEDURAL CHANGES

A.

Specification of Claimed Secrets

Trade secret litigation is very expensive and disruptive, especially for the start-up technology company which must struggle to
achieve credibility with customers, employees and sources of financing. As a result, trade secret lawsuits are very effective in the hands
of unscrupulous plaintiffs who would pursue a claim not to achieve
protection of a legitimate trade secret, but simply to harrass and
possibly destroy a new competitor. Recognizing this problem, the
Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the California State
Bar reported its view on a potential amendment to the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act at the 1983 Conference of Delegates:
[T]here should be a measure of protection against the institution
of an action to pursue extensive discovery without revelation of
the trade secret or secrets, and there should be codification of the
principle that general allegations of designs, processes, techniques and know-how are inadequate (Diodes,Inc. v. Franzen,
et al., 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 252 [1968]). 4 5
As a result, a new provision was enacted as Section 2036.2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure:
In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret
under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act .
discovery relating to the trade secret. ..

before commencing
the party alleging the
.,

,

misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable
particularity subject to any orders which may be appropriate
under Section 3426.5 of the Civil Code [for the protection of confidentiality of alleged trade secrets].
In practice, this legislatioi can be expected to achieve a
salutory result. Potential plaintiffs who are put to the task of identifying exactly what it is they claim to have been stolen will have to
pause and consider carefully their motives for bringing the action in
the first place. In addition, the provison will help to narrow the
scope (and therefore the cost) of discovery in trade secret litigation,
since the parties will be able to conduct discovery only in relation to
the specific matters alleged to have been misappropriated. Indeed,
it is entirely possible that a defendant, when confronted with the
required list, may express a willingness to stipulate to injunctive relief as to some or all of the described secrets thereby further narrowing the scope of the controversy or eliminating it altogether.
45. Report of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section to the California State Bar
Conference of Delegates (August 1983).
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Protection of Trade Secrets in the Litigation Process

One potential difficulty inherent in litigating a trade secret dispute in the courts is the possibility that a party's trade secrets will
be further compromised by disclosure to the other party or the public. Under the common law, the courts have recognized their inherent power to avoid such a result by the imposition of protective
orders designed to limit access to the court files and to limit disclosure and use of information secured by the parties in discovery. 4 6
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act codifies these cases, and specifically
authorizes a court to take whatever action is appropriate to protection of the secrets being litigated, including protective orders in discovery, closed hearings, and even sealing the entire records of the
action.47 An interesting aspect of the statute is that it directs the
court to protect information which is claimed to be a trade secret
without respect to whether it in fact qualifies as such: "In an action
under this title, a court shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade
secret by reasonable means." 4 8 Therefore, a reasonable argument
could be made that a court is without discretion to deny reasonable
protection to any matter which either party claims to be a trade
secret, before an actual trial is held to determine the validity of the
secrecy claimed.
C. Statute of Limitations
California previously applied a two year limitations period to
trade secret claims. 49 Under the Uniform Act, the period is extended to three years after the misappropriation is discovered or
with reasonable diligence should have been discovered.5" A continuing misappropriation is treated as a single claim for limitations
purposes.5 1
D. Effective Date
The statute is effective for all acts of misappropriation occurring on and after January 1, 1985. If a "continuing misappropria46. Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (declining discovery); People v. Serrata, 62 Cal. App. 3d 9, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144, 146-148
(1976) (quashing of blanket subpoena); Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Den-Mat, Inc. 197 U.S.P.Q.
62 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (control over scope of discovery by court).

47.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.5 (West 1985).

48. Id.
49. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Daiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 267 F. Supp.
726, 730, modified, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969).
50. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.6 (West 1985).
51. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.6 (West 1985).
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tion" began before that date and went on into 1985, the Act would
not apply to the earlier conduct. It would apply to the later conduct, so long as it would have been considered misappropriation
under the common law.5 2
IV.

INJUNCTIONS
A.

Time Period

The California statute, which tracks the Uniform Act on this
subject, requires that an injunction be terminated when a trade secret ceases to exist as such, but permits the court to extend the
injunction for an additional period "in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation."5 3 The Act thereby rejects the concept of permanent
injunctions, but permits the court to protect a plaintiff's "headstart"
or "lead time" by prohibiting use by a misappropriator even when
the trade secret has entered the public domain, if the defendant had
gained an advantage over the general public through having had
earlier access to the material.5 4 For example, a defendant may
claim that it should not be penalized for having misappropriated
what the plaintiff claims as a trade secret, because the information
can be reproduced from public data and is therefore "readily ascertainable."5 5 The court may reject that assertion, finding instead
that the defendant, had it not misappropriated the technology,
would have required a particular, substantial period of time to
collect the data or reverse engineer the technology. This time period becomes the plaintiff's "lead time" which the defendant has
misappropriated, and is tacked onto the injunction period that
otherwise would be imposed.
B. Royalty As Alternative to Injunctive Relief
Even in a clear case of misappropriation, an injunction against
future use may nevertheless be denied for a number of reasons.
Among these are an overriding public interest, such as a government requirement of availability of certain equipment. In addition,
as noted above, a trade secret may have been disclosed to a defendant without its knowledge, and before learning of the true status of
the information the defendant may have spent substantial sums in
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.10 (West 1985). See Appendix A, infra, Amendment 5.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 1985).
54. See supra, note 19.
55. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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commercial exploitation, or may have so irretrievably incorporated
the data into its products that future use could not be prohibited
without causing enormous loss. Under such circumstances, the
statute permits the court to "condition future use upon payment of
a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time the use
could have been prohibited." 5 6
C. Affirmative Acts
In many trade secret actions, a major part of the plaintiff's
complaint is the actual carrying away or retention of documents or
goods which the plaintiff claims as its property. Seeking return of
such materials, a plaintiff could run up against the traditional judicial antipathy toward mandatory injunctions, and might be left with
the cumbersome alternative of a parallel proceeding in replevin.
The Uniform Act lays to rest such concerns, and expressly provides
that "affirmative acts to protect a trade secret may be compelled by
court order."5 7 Moreover, the statute appears to authorize the
court to impound products or work in process which infringe the
plaintiff's trade secret rights.
V. DAMAGES
A.

Generally

The statute follows the common law rules concerning measure
of damages in a trade secret action. A plaintiff may recover damages for its own loss as a result of the misappropriation, and may
also recover the resulting gain to the defendant (unjust enrichment),
to the extent that the second element does not duplicate the first.,5 8
B. Royalty
As noted above, when an injunction might otherwise be appropriate, but a court determines that circumstances are such that an
injunction cannot be entered, a royalty may be imposed. The Act
also provides for imposition of involuntary royalties by the court if
the plaintiff cannot prove either element of damage specified by the
statute. In the event that such a royalty is imposed, it may not
continue beyond the time when an injunction against use could have
56. CAL CIV. CODE § 3426.2(b) (West 1985). See Official Comments to this subsection. In their 1984 amendments to the Uniform Act, the Commissioners further defined the
royalty alternative as available under "exceptional circumstances". See Appendix A, infra.
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(c) (West 1985).
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(a) (Vest 1985).
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been imposed. 9 Whenever a "reasonable" royalty is to be determined by the court, it is incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate the extent to which the plaintiff's trade secret niay account
only for a portion of the revenues or profits realized by the defendant's sales. In the absence of such proof, the court would be justified in imposing a royalty which related to the defendant's entire
income from such sales.
C. Punitive Damages
Under the common law, punitive damages for trade secret misappropriation were available under the same standards as applicable
to other torts. They could be determined by a jury and were limited
only by vague standards of reasonable relation to the actual damages or wealth of the defendant. Under the Uniform Act, punitive
damages are left to the discretion of the court, and the maximum
amount awardable is double the compensatory damages proved.' °
To recover punitive damages the plaintiff must prove "willful and
malicious misappropriation."
While the California statute was
before the legislature for consideration, a tentative amendment was
enacted, changing this standard to "willful or malicious," at the
urging of the State Bar. In the final version, however, the Uniform
Act language was restored.6 1
D. Attorneys' Fees
A major change from the common law is effected by the Uniform Act, by allowing attorneys' fees in any of the following situations: (1) where a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith;
(2) where a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in
bad faith; or (3) where willful and malicious misappropriation exists.6' The official comments indicate that the new remedy is included "as a deterrent to specious claims" by a plaintiff or
defendant. Moreover, the Commissioners point out that where
"willful and malicious misappropriation" exists, the court should
59.
60.

CAL. CIV. CODE
CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 3426.3(b) (West 1985).
§ 3426.3(c) (West 1985).

61. The change was proposed by the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the
State Bar, on the ground that the standard was too high. The American Electronics Association, testifying before the Senate Committee on Judiciary, pointed out that the term "willful"
has been interpreted to include voluntary action without an intent to achieve the result
caused, and that the phrase "willful and malicious" has been employed successfully in other
legislation, such as the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (West 1985).
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take into consideration whether puntive damages may be awarded,
in deciding whether to grant an additional award for attorneys' fees.
Although the Act is not explicit on this point, there appears to
be no reason why an application cannot be made to the court under
this section for an award of attorneys' fees in conjunction with an
application for preliminary injunction. Although the court in such
a proceeding does not make final findings of fact, another statute
indicates that the legislature intends that such a remedy be available
in pretrial proceedings.6 3 In many cases, a plaintiff will be justified
in filing an action based only upon a reasonable suspicion that the
defendant has misappropriated its trade secrets. However, by the
time of the preliminary injunction, a plaintiff will typically have had
the opportunity to conduct sufficient discovery so that it can be held
to a higher standard of proof. If at that point the plaintiff continues
to assert its request for injunctive relief based on supposition and
tenuous circumstantial evidence, the trial court may be justified in
awarding attorneys' fees to the defendant.
Both plaintiff's and defendant's counsel must be attentive to
the impact of an award of attorneys' fees. From the plaintiff's perspective, this calls for a continuing assessment of the merits of the
claims, and a pursuit of remedies which are related to the realistically anticipated harm. For defendants, this means cooperating in
return of materials belonging to the plaintiff at the earliest opportunity, inviting the plaintiff to discuss resolution of legitimate concerns without continued litigation, and the continued reappraisal of
defenses to assure that they are supported by the facts.
VI.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER STATUTES AND REMEDIES

A.

GeneralProvisions

The first two subsections of Civil Code Section 3426.7 describe
the effect of the Uniform Act on other State laws and remedies:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, this title does not
supersede any statue relating to misappropriation of a trade secret, or any statute otherwise regulating trade secrets.
(b) This title does not affect (1) contractual remedies, whether or
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret, (2) other civil
remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade
secret, or (3) criminal remedies whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.
63. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1985).
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The language of subsection (a) was changed from that appearing in the Uniform Act, which reads:
This Act displaces conflicting tort, restitiutionary, and other law
of this State pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of a
trade secret.
It is not clear from the available legislative history why this change
was made. It appeared in the first version of the California statute,
introduced as Assembly Bill 3738 in the 1981-82 legislature. From
an examination of the rest of the statute, as well as the official comments, however, the subsituted language does not appear to open
the door to litigation of trade secret claims outside the procedures
established by the Act. The legislature was motivated to consider
the Act by a perception that undue uncertainty existed in the law
concerning trade secret remedies. 64 Moreover, Civil Code Section
3426.8 requires that the Act "be applied and construed to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this title among states enacting it."
Therefore, the somewhat different language used in the California version of the statute should be interpreted to indicate that nonstatutory theories for trade secret relief do not remain available, at
least not where the result would be an evasion of the procedural
protections and defintions provided by the Act. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the statute's major objective of achieving a
unitary approach to reolution of these problems.
It is true that the Act, both in its initial form and as enacted in
California, exempts contractual remedies from its scope. 65 But this
should not mean that private parties are free to contract away the
procedural protections of the statute. For instance, the Act should
still apply in a case where an employer is seeking trade secret relief
based on a non-disclosure agreement and frames its pleading to rely
solely on breach of that contract. In the same vein, the Act should
not be construed to abrogate the common law rule that private parties cannot agree by contract that something is a trade secret when
in fact it is not. Not only is this conclusion supported by a common
sense review of the statute and its legislative history, but is also
compelled by California's strong policy in favor of a freely competi64. Staff analysis on Assembly Bill 501 prepared for the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, dated April 25, 1983, page 2 [hereinafter cited as Staff Analysis].
65. The original version of the California statute used the phrase "rights and remedies".
This was amended in Committee to limit the exemption to contractual remedies.
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tive marketplace. 6
B. State Agency Disclosures
Califonia's version of the Uniform Act includes a unique provision which exempts application of the statute to disclosure of a record by a state or local agency pursuant to the Public Records Act.
As to such disclosures, the law to be applied is that which was in
effect before the operative date of the new statue. 7 This provision
was inserted apparently at the request of California Rural Legal
Assistance, which had expressed concern about possible impact on
availability of pesticide data. 8 Curiously, the issue seems to have
been separately addressed in the same session of the legislature by
the enactment of Government Code Section 6254; therefore, this
anomoly in the Act was probably unnecessary.6 9
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Uniform Trade Secrets Act does not provide easy answers
to all the difficult issues inherent in disputes over proprietary data.
Its contribution is in updating and clarifying a number of important
concepts, and in broadening the scope of available precedent to include court decisions from other states. Moreover, California's version of the statute provides a well-balanced mechanism for
controlling potential abuses of litigation while still preserving and
expanding effective remedies for misappropriation.
66.

Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley 622 F.2d 1324, 1338 (9th Cir.

1980).
67.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(c) (West 1985).

68. Staff Analysis, supra note 64. The author noted the concern of CRLA that the
Uniform Act "might be construed to limit public access to pesticide testing data under the
Public Records Act."
69. Government Code § 6254.1 provides that pesticide information shall be open to
public inspection under the same standards as are set forth in the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-

cide and Rodenticide Act.
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APPENDIX A
AMENDMENTS TO
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
December 17, 1984

AMENDMENT 1
Section 1 of the Act is amended to read:
SECTION 1. [Definitions]
As used in this Act, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other
means;
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade
secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge
of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had
reason to know that his knowledge of the trade
secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who
had utilized improper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving
rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy orlimit its use; or
(C) before §1material change of hi position,
knew or had reason to know that it was a trade

seeret and that knowledge of it had been ae
guired by aeeident or mistake.
(IV) acquired by accident or mistake.
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or
any other legal commercial entity.
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a
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formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Comment on Amendment
This proposed amendment derives from the proposed amendments to Sections 2(b) and 3(a) that deal with a material change of
position by a good faith acquirer. In view of these proposed amendments, which respond to concerns expressed by the American Bar
Association Patent Section, it is redundant to continue to deal with
this issue in the definition of misappropriation.
AMENDMENT 2
Section 2 of the Act is amended to read:
SECTION 2. [Injunctive Reliefl
(a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.
Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be terminated
when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be
continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to
eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived
from the misappropriation.

()If the court determines; that it would be uunreagon able to
_h2t

F

tdreU.sc

In exceptional circumstances,an injunction may

condition future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no
longer than the period of timefor which use could have been prohibited. Exceptionalcircumstancesinclude, but are not limited to, a material andprejudicia change ofposition prior to acquiringknowledge
or reason to know of misappropriationthat renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable.
(c) In appropriate circumstances, affirmative acts to protect a
trade secret may be compelled by court order.
Comment on Amendment
This proposed amendment adopts the American Bar Association Patent Section's proferred "exceptional circumstances" stan-
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dard for a royalty order injunction. A definition of "exceptional
curcumstances" makes clear that a material and prejudicial change
of position by a good faith acquirer can consitiute an exceptional
curcumstance.
AMENDMENT 3

Section 3 of the Act is amended to read:
SECTION 3. [Damages]
(a)_n addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief Except to the
extent that a materialand prejudicialchange ofpositionprior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriationrenders a
monetary recovery inequitable, a complainant maY is entitled to. recover damages for - the actual loss caused by misappropriation. A.
.o plaiant akc.may r..v.r fOr Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing damages-fOr actual loss. If a complainantis uanble to prove a
greater amount of damages by other methods of measurement, the
damages caused by misappropriationcan be measured exclusively by
impostlion of liabilityfor a reasonable royaltyfor a miappropriator's
unquthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
Comment on Amendment
This proposed amendment responds to the American Bar Association Patent Section's concern that measurement of damages by
a reasonable royalty unintientionally is precluded. The amendment
clarifies both the continued availability of the remedy and the circumstances under which it is available.
AMENDMENT 4
Section 7 of the Act is amended to read:
SECTION 7. [Effect on Other Law]
(a) This Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act displaces
conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this State penin
t- providing civil libilitY remedies for misappropriation of a trade
secret.
(b) This Act does not affect:
(1) contractual or other ciil liability or relief that is remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret;
or
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(2) criminl, ]'ability for other civil remedies that are not
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret-; or
(3) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriationof a trade secret.
Commment on Amendment
This proposed amendment responds to the American Bar Association Patent Section's concern that the Act is unclear as to
whether contractual remedies are precluded with respect to conduct
that is both a breach of contract and statutory trade secret misappropriation. Section 7 is clarified to preempt only certain other
legal rights providing remedies for miappropriation. Contractual
remedies expressly are excluded from preemption.
AMENDMENT 5
Section 11 of the Act is amended to read:
SECTION 11. [Time of Taking Effect]
This Act takes effect on _,
and does not apply to misappropriation occurring prior to the effective date. With respect to a
continuing misappropriationthat began priorto the effective date, the
Act also does not apply to misappropriationthat occurs after the effective date.
Comment on Amendment
This proposed amendment responds to the American Bar Association Patent Section' concern that the applicability of the Act to
a continuing misappropriation that began prior to its effective date
is unclear. The proposed amendment excludes all coverage of a continuing course of misappropriation that began prior to the Act's effective date.
IX.

APPENDIX B
SYNOPSIS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CALIFORNIA UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT

The first bill was introduced substantially in the form of the
Uniform Act as Assembly Bill 3738 (Harris) in the 1981-82 legislature on March 25, 1982.
AB 3738 was amended on May 12, 1982, to strike the statutory
definition of "trade secret" and add provisions allowing disclosure
of trade secrets by court order or through government agencies in
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order to avoid injustice. This amendment resulted from concerns
raised by California Rural Legal Assistance regarding availability to
farm workers of pesticide formulas. The bill died in committee.
The legistlation was re-introduced in the next session of the
legislature on February 7, 1983, as AB 501 (Harris). The format
was the same as the original version of former AB 3738.
On April 21, 1983, the bill was amended in the following
respects:
(1) In Section 3426.2(a), the word "reasonable" was stricken
as a qualifier to the phrase "period of time" as relating to continuing an injunction for the "headstart" period.
(2) Section 3426.3(a) was amended by striking the phrase "in
addition to or in lieu of injunctive relief' which had introduced the
section on damages.
(3) Section 3426.3(b) was added as a new section, as a result
of suggested amendments by the patent, trademark and copyright
section of the America Bar Association and the Patent Law Association, to the effect that a reasonable royalty could be imposed by the
court, not to exceed the permissible injunction period, in the event
that damages were not provable.
(4) Section 3426.8 was inserted, to the effect that the statute
did not affect any "contractual rights or remedies" [note that this
provision was changed in the final version: see Section 3426.7,
which refers only to "contractual remedies"].
(5) Section 3426.11 was inserted, as a result of a suggestion by
the patent, trademark and copyright section of the American Bar
Association, providing that the Act would apply to that portion of
a "continuing misappropriation".which occurred after the effective
date of the statute.
(6) Code of Civil Procedures Section 2036.2 was added, at the
suggestion of the State Bar, to the effect that a trade secret plaintiff
before discovery begins, must identify its trade secrets "with particularity" [note that this provision was changed in the final version of
the statute by the insertion of the qualifier "reasonable"].
(7) Added a new Government Code Section 6266, to the effect
that no damage claim could be made against a government employee for disclosure of a public record, unless the disclosure was
made in bad faith.
On May 3, 1983, the bill was amended to drop the proposed
new Government Code Section 6266, and to add Civil Code Section 3426.7 [providing for application of pre-existing law to government disclosures].
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On July 6, 1984, the following changes were made:
(1) Section 3426.3(c) was amended to change "willful and malicious" to "willful or malicious", and to change "twice" to "three
times the amount of" [both of these amendments were later
reversed].
(2) Section 3426.4 was amended to change "willful and malicious" to "willful or malicious" [this amendment was later
reversed].
(3) Section 3426.11 was amended to change the effective date
of the statute to January 1, 1985.
(4) Code of Civil Procedure Section 2036.2 was amended to
insert the word "reasonable" as a qualifier to "particularity".
On August 15, 1984, the following amendments were made in
approving the final version of the statute:
(1) Section 3426.1(a) was amended to add to the definition of
"improper means": "reverse engineering or independent derivation
alone shall not be considered improper means."
(2) Section 3426.1(d)(1) amended the definition of "trade secret" by removing "and not being readily assertalnable by proper
means by" and inserting "the public." At the same time, at the
request of the American Electronics Association, the official comments to this section of the statute were amended to include the
following paragraph:
The phrase 'and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by' was included in this section as originally proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It
was removed from the section in favor of the phrase 'the public
or to.' This change was made because the original language was
viewed as ambiguous in the definition of a trade secret. However, the assertion that a matter is readily ascertainable by
proper means remains available as a defense to a claim of
misappropriation.
(3) Sections 3426.3(c) and 342 .4 were amended to restore the
"willful and malicious" standard and to restore the punitive damage
measure as double the actual damage.
(4) Section 3426.7(b) was amended, using language suggested
by the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the ABA, to
strike "this title does not affect any contractual rights or remedies," and to substitute the language found in the final version of the
statute.

